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INTRODUCTION 
 
On January 31, 2012, 312,949,403 people lived in the United 
States.
1
 Nearly eleven and a half million of those people were 
undocumented immigrants.
2
  Whether the right to bear arms conferred 
to “the people” by the Second Amendment reaches those 11.4 million 
people depends on whether undocumented immigrants make up part of 
“the people.”   
Placing human beings into figurative, linguistic boxes can be a 
fickle adventure. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines a human 
being as “a person.”3 At first blush, that contention does not present 
                                                 
 J.D. candidate, December 2015, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois 
Institute of Technology; B.A., English Literature, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, 2010. 
1
  U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/popclock/ (last updated Nov. 26, 2015). 
2
  Brian Baker & Nancy Rytina, ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED 
IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2012, at 1 
(2013), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_ill_pe_2012_2.pdf. 
3
 Person, MERRIAM–WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/person.  
1
Etchingham: Who Are "The People?": The Seventh Circuit Extends Second Amendme
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2015
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 11, Issue 1                            Fall 2015 
 
93 
 
much controversy. However, in the eyes of the law, human beings may 
not qualify as “persons.” And collectively, a group of persons may not 
make up “the people.”   
The United States Constitution makes extensive use of the term 
“the people.” Elsewhere, the Constitution, presumably deliberately, 
uses other terms, such as “persons” or “citizens” or “Citizens.”  
Though the phrase “the people” appears throughout the Constitution, 
and though courts contrast the phrase with “persons” or “citizens,” 
who or what constitutes “the people” keeps legal scholars, courts, and 
students busy.  
In the 2015 case United States v. Meza-Rodriguez,
4
 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that 
undocumented immigrants in the United States who have developed 
sufficient connections with the country are part of “the people” to 
whom the Second Amendment confers a right to bear arms. In so 
doing, the Seventh Circuit employed the sufficient connections test for 
defining “the people.” This decision is consistent with the U.S. 
Constitution and previous Second Amendment jurisprudence.  
Part I of this article details relevant Supreme Court cases, 
including District of Columbia v. Heller, the landmark Second 
Amendment case, and United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, which 
addressed “the people” protected by the Fourth Amendment. Part II 
examines United States v. Meza-Rodriguez factually and procedurally. 
It also discusses the Seventh Circuit’s majority opinion and Judge 
Flaum’s concurrence. Finally, Part III analyzes the circuit split on this 
Second Amendment issue as it pertains to undocumented immigrants, 
and explains why the Seventh Circuit’s approach in Meza-Rodriguez is 
superior to the approaches adopted by the Courts of Appeals for the 
Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
  United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2015). 
2
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BACKGROUND  
 
A.  The Second Amendment and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) 
 
The Second Amendment provides that “the right of the people to 
keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.”5  In District of Columbia 
v. Heller, the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment confers 
an individual right to keep and bear arms.
6
 While the right to bear 
arms has been dubbed an “ancient right,”7 that right is not unlimited.8 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g) statutorily mandates restrictions on the possession 
of firearms for various groups of people, including: convicted felons; 
fugitives from justice; unlawful users of controlled substances; and the 
mentally ill, among others.
9
 The statute also restricts “any person . . . 
who, being an alien . . . is illegally or unlawfully in the United States” 
from possessing a firearm,
10
 the group of people addressed in United 
States v. Meza-Rodriguez and three other federal appellate court 
opinions. The Second Amendment confers a right to “the people,” but 
the Supreme Court has not addressed whether the undocumented 
immigrants restricted from firearm possession by 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(5) are included in “the people.” 
   
B.  District of Columbia v. Heller
11
 
 
In Heller, the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment 
confers an individual right to bear arms.
12
 In Heller, a Washington, 
D.C., statute effectively served as a total ban on handgun possession.
13
 
                                                 
5
 U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
6
 Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008). 
7
 Id. at 599. 
8
 Id. at 595. 
9
 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012). 
10
 Id. § 922(g)(5). 
11
 554 U.S. 570. 
12
 Id. at 595. 
13
 Id. at 635. 
3
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A D.C. police officer brought suit seeking an injunction to prohibit 
Washington, D.C., from enforcing the ban.
14
  Justice Scalia delivered 
the opinion of the five to four majority.
15
 The Court did not seek to 
determine the “full scope” of the Second Amendment,16 and, therefore, 
Heller left open the question of Second Amendment rights of 
undocumented immigrants within the United States. 
In a distinctly textual analysis, Justice Scalia first looked to the 
operative clause of the Second Amendment and focused on “the right 
of the people.”17 He highlighted the prevalence of “the people” 
throughout the Constitution and concluded that the First, Fourth, and 
Ninth Amendments refer to individual rights, not collective rights.
18
 
Moreover, “the people” refers to “all members of the political 
community,”19 but Justice Scalia also stated in dicta that the right 
“belongs to all Americans,”20 though he did not say the right belongs 
only to Americans. Moreover, Justice Scalia relied on United States v. 
Verdugo-Urquidez to reinforce the sufficient connections test: the 
Supreme Court views “the people” as referring to a “class of persons 
who are part of a national community or who have otherwise 
developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part 
of that community.”21   
It is also worth noting that Justice Scalia considered restrictions 
on the Second Amendment right to bear arms as permissible, stating 
that not all restrictions infringe on Second Amendment rights.
22
  
However, the D.C. restriction was deemed “severe” and 
unconstitutional.
23
 
                                                 
14
 Id. at 575. 
15
 Id. at 595. 
16
 Id. at 627. 
17
 Id. at 579. 
18
 Id.  
19
 Id. at 580. 
20
 Id. at 581. 
21
 Id. at 580. 
22
 Id. at 629. 
23
 Id.  
4
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C.  United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez
24
 
 
The Second Amendment is not the only amendment in the Bill of 
Rights that confers rights to “the people”; the First and Fourth 
Amendments also confer rights to “the people.” While the Supreme 
Court has not addressed whether undocumented immigrants are within 
“the people” to whom the Second Amendment confers a right to bear 
arms, the Court has considered the constitutional rights granted to 
undocumented immigrants by other amendments. In United States v. 
Verdugo-Urquidez, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether 
the Fourth Amendment protected undocumented immigrants outside 
the territory of the United States.
25
 In Verdugo-Urquidez, a citizen and 
resident of Mexico involved in narcotics cartels was arrested in 
Mexico for cartel activities connected to the United States, and he was 
transported to the United States before his trial.
26
  While he was in 
United States custody, U.S. law enforcement officers searched his 
home in Mexico without a search warrant.
27
 The officers found 
evidence linking the defendant to the drug trade.
28
 The defendant 
brought a motion to suppress the evidence recovered at the house in 
Mexico, arguing that the warrantless search violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights.
29
 The district court agreed and suppressed the 
fruits of the warrantless search, and the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
30
 In reaching this decision, the Ninth 
Circuit relied on INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,
31
 where the Supreme Court 
                                                 
24
 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
25
  Id. at 266. 
26
  Id. at 262. 
27
  Id. 
28
  Id. at 262–63. 
29
  Id. at 263. 
30
  United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988). 
31
  468 U.S. 1032 (1984). 
5
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assumed that the Fourth Amendment protected undocumented 
immigrants in the United States.
32
 
The Supreme Court reversed.
33
 The Court initially looked to the 
Fifth Amendment,
34
 which provides insight into the Fourth 
Amendment
35: both amendments carry a “scale of rights” that ascends 
with ties to the United States.
36
 However, the Court found that the 
Fifth Amendment operated differently than the Fourth Amendment.
37
 
While Fifth Amendment violations occur during trial, a Fourth 
Amendment violation occurs at the time of the search.
38
  
The Court then turned to the meaning of “the people.”39 The Court 
highlighted the idea that the phrase “the people” is found in the First, 
Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments, as well as the 
Preamble and Article I.
40
 The Court concluded that the proliferation of 
the phrase “suggests that ‘the people’ protected by the Fourth 
Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments, and to whom 
rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, 
refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or 
who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this county 
to be considered part of that community.”41 This is known as the 
sufficient connections test,
42
 or the substantial connections test. The 
Court has only assumed, but never held, that Fourth Amendment rights 
attach to undocumented immigrants within the United States, and the 
                                                 
32
  Id. at 1050. 
33
 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 275. 
34
 “No person shall be held to answer for a . . . crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a grand jury.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
35
 “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
36
 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265, 269. 
37
 Id. at 265. 
38
 Id. 
39
 Id.  
40
 Id. at 266. 
41
 Id.  
42
 Id. at 282 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
6
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Court did not decide that question in Verdugo-Urquidez.
43
 Applying 
the sufficient connections test to this case, the Court found that 
Verdugo-Urquidez would have failed the test because he “had no 
voluntary connection” with the United States that “might place him 
among ‘the people’ of the United States.”44 Thus, the Court in 
Verdugo-Urquidez, at the very least, set forth the sufficient connections 
test for deciding who constitutes “the people” under the Fourth 
Amendment. In the process, it highlighted the prevalence of the phrase 
throughout the United States’ most sacred legal document. 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence promoted a broader reading of the 
Fourth Amendment right.
45
 While he did not put weight into the phrase 
“the people,” Justice Kennedy highlighted that the phrase “may be 
interpreted to underscore the importance of the right, rather than to 
restrict” the potential group protected by the right.46 In the dissent, 
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, focused on two concepts: 
mutuality and fundamental fairness.
47
 He admonished the majority’s 
“narrow construction” of “the people,” and would have held that the 
defendant was part of “the people” protected by the Fourth 
Amendment because he was part of “the governed.”48 
 
UNITED STATES V. MEZA-RODRIGUEZ 
 
A.  Factual Background  
 
On August 24, 2013, Milwaukee police officers responded to a 
call concerning an armed person at a Milwaukee bar.
49
 Bar 
surveillance captured video of a man pointing an object resembling a 
gun, and witnesses from the bar identified Mariano A. Meza-
                                                 
43
 Id. at 271–72 (majority opinion). 
44
 Id. at 273. 
45
 Id. at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
46
 Id. at 277. 
47
 Id. at 284 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
48
 Id. at 287. 
49
 United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 2015).  
7
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Rodriguez as the person in the video.
50
  Later that night, officers 
responding to a different report broke up a fight and recognized Mr. 
Meza-Rodriguez as the man from the bar video.
51
 Mr. Meza-
Rodriguez was arrested by the Milwaukee police officers with a .22 
caliber cartridge on his person.
52
  On October 9, 2013, a federal grand 
jury indicted Mr. Meza-Rodriguez on a single count of being an illegal 
alien in possession of ammunition under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5).
53
 
 
B.  Procedural Background 
 
Mr. Meza-Rodriguez brought three motions before the court: (1) a 
motion to dismiss the indictment for failure to allege an element of the 
offense; (2) a motion to dismiss the indictment for violating Mr. Meza-
Rodriguez’s Second Amendment right to bear arms; and (3) a motion 
to suppress evidence.
54
 Judge Randa of the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin sent the case to Magistrate 
Judge Callahan to hear the motions.
55
 Judge Callahan recommended 
that the district court deny all three motions.
56
 Judge Randa adopted 
Magistrate Judge Callahan’s recommendations on the motions in toto, 
as well as the rationale upon which the recommendations rested.
57
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
50
 Id. 
51
 Id.  
52
 Id.  
53
 United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, No. 13-CR-192, 2014 WL 1406301, at *1 
(E.D. Wis. Apr. 11, 2014). 
54
 Id. at *2. 
55
 Id. at *1. 
56
 Id.  
57
 Id. 
8
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1.  District Court Adopts Magistrate Judge Callahan’s 
Recommendations 
 
Magistrate Judge Callahan analyzed Meza-Rodriguez’s motion to 
dismiss by addressing his facial challenge of § 922(g)(5).
58
 Judge 
Callahan started his analysis with a look to Heller to find that “the 
people” refers to all members of the political community and “belongs 
to all Americans.”59 He then distinguished this case from Heller by 
stating that Heller did not provide a comprehensive scope of the 
Second Amendment right and the Supreme Court had not addressed 
the issue as it pertains to undocumented immigrants.
60
 For guidance, 
the court instead turned to the federal circuit court cases that have held 
that “the people” does not include undocumented immigrants within 
the United States.
61
 The court found these decisions persuasive. The 
court further rejected the Verdugo-Uriquidez sufficient connections 
test by relying on the Fifth Circuit’s rejection of the test in United 
States v. Portillo-Munoz.
62
 Accordingly, the court found that Second 
Amendment rights did not extend to Mr. Meza-Rodriguez.
63
 
After the denial of Mr. Meza-Rodriguez’s motions, he pled guilty 
to violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) while preserving the Second 
Amendment issue for appeal.
64
 As the result of an interview with an 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement officer, removal proceedings 
were initiated against Mr. Meza-Rodriguez, and he was eventually 
deported to Mexico.
65
 He filed a timely notice of appeal in the Seventh 
Circuit.
66
 
 
                                                 
58
 Id. at *4–6. 
59
 Id. at *1. 
60
 Id. at *4. 
61
 Id. at *5. 
62
 Id.; United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 440 (5th Cir. 2011). 
63
 Meza-Rodriguez, No. 13-CR-192, 2014 WL 1406301, at *6. 
64
 United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664, 667 (7th Cir. 2015).  
65
 Id.  
66
 Id.  
9
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C.  The Seventh Circuit’s Panel Opinion 
 
1.  Opinion of the Court 
 
Chief Judge Wood, joined by Judge Easterbrook and in the 
judgment with Judge Flaum, held that the Second Amendment confers 
to undocumented immigrants within the United States a right to bear 
arms.
67
 As a preliminary procedural matter, Chief Judge Wood held 
that Mr. Meza-Rodriguez appeal was not moot.
68
 To not be rendered 
moot, an appeal must represent a case or controversy where the 
appellant ‘“must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury 
traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable 
judicial decision.’”69 Chief Judge Wood found this requirement 
satisfied because an unfavorable decision would bar his admission to 
the United States and a favorable decision would leave open the 
possibility of admission.
70
 The potential return to the United States 
constituted a tangible benefit and his inability to reenter constituted a 
concrete or continuing injury.
71
 Therefore, the appeal was not moot.
72
 
In reviewing the merits of the case de novo, Chief Judge Wood 
looked to Heller.
73
 She confronted “passing references” in Heller that 
indicated a link between a Second Amendment right and “notions of 
‘law-abiding citizens’ and ‘members of the political community.’”74 
However, she was “reluctant to place more weight on these passing 
references than the [Heller] Court itself did.”75 Chief Judge Wood 
acknowledged that the three circuits to decide this issue held that, 
under Heller, the Second Amendment did not confer a right to 
                                                 
67
 Id. at 672.  
68
 Id. at 667. 
69
 Id.  
70
 Id. at 668. 
71
 Id.  
72
 Id.  
73
 Id. at 669. 
74
 Id. (quoting Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 (2008)). 
75
 Id.  
10
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unlawful aliens to bear arms, and the Tenth Circuit declined to decide 
the issue because § 922(g)(5) passed intermediate scrutiny. 
However, the court declined to follow the other circuits because 
“[t]he issue was not . . . before the Court in Heller.”76 Instead, Chief 
Judge Wood looked to other language in Heller to arrive at a 
conclusion opposite the three other circuits.
77
 As Heller pointed out, 
the Second Amendment is intimately linked to the First and Fourth 
Amendments,
78
 and, therefore, those three amendments implicitly 
carry the same meaning for the phrase “the people,” which appears in 
all three.
79
 Accordingly, the Second Amendment could be analyzed as 
a “package” with the other amendments and thus be interpreted 
similarly.
80
 
Chief Judge Wood then looked to United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez,
81
 the Fourth Amendment Supreme Court case involving an 
unauthorized alien.
82
 Recall that Verdugo-Rodriguez set forth a test for 
determining whether noncitizens receive Fourth Amendment 
protections. This test—the sufficient connections test—considers 
whether the undocumented immigrant is within the territory of the 
United States and whether she can show sufficient connections with 
the United States.
83
 Chief Judge Wood applied this test in Meza-
Rodriguez.
84
 Chief Judge Wood determined that Mr. Meza-Rodriguez 
did have sufficient connections with the United States: he had been in 
the United States for over twenty years since the age of four or five, he 
                                                 
76
 Id.  
77
 Id. (“[A]ll people, including non-U.S. citizens, whether or not they are 
authorized to be in the country, enjoy at least some rights under the Second 
Amendment.”). 
78
 Heller, 554 U.S. at 592. 
79
 Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 669. 
80
 Id. at 670. 
81
 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) (“[A]liens receive constitutional protections when 
they have come within the territory of the United States and developed sufficient 
connections” with the United States). 
82
 Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 670. 
83
 Id.; accord Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271. 
84
 Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 670–71. 
11
Etchingham: Who Are "The People?": The Seventh Circuit Extends Second Amendme
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2015
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 11, Issue 1                            Fall 2015 
 
103 
 
attended public school in the United States, worked in the United 
States, and developed close relationships with people in the United 
States.
85
 She buttressed her reasoning with Plyler v. Doe,
86
 which held 
that “aliens receive constitutional protections when they have come 
within the territory of the United States and developed substantial 
connections with this country.”87 Therefore, Mr. Meza-Rodriguez was 
entitled to constitutional protections because he was within the 
territory of the United States and had developed sufficient connections 
with the United States.
88
 Accordingly, Mr. Meza-Rodriguez was part 
of “the people” to whom the Second Amendment right to bear arms 
applies.
89
 
However, in reaching this decision, the Seventh Circuit did 
recognize that Second Amendment rights are not unlimited; they are 
subject to certain restrictions, particularly under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
90
 
The Seventh Circuit therefore adopted an intermediate scrutiny 
standard of review to determine the constitutionality of § 922(g)(5).
91
 
Thus, §922(g)(5) is constitutional if its restrictions are substantially 
related to an important governmental objective.
92
 Chief Judge Wood 
found that the governmental objective of § 922(g)(5) is to ‘“keep guns 
out of the hands of presumptively risky people’ and to ‘suppress[ ] 
armed violence.’”93 Chief Judge Wood reasoned that undocumented 
immigrants in the United States fit that group of presumptively risky 
people.
94
 Accordingly, Chief Judge Wood held that Congress’ interest 
in restricting firearm possession of this difficult to track group is 
                                                 
85
 Id. 
86
 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
87
 Id. at 210. 
88
 Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 672. 
89
 Id. 
90
 Id. 
91
 Id. 
92
 Id. 
93
 Id. at 673 (quoting United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 683 (7th Cir. 
2010)). 
94
 Id.  
12
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“strong enough” to find that § 922(g)(5) does not impermissibly 
infringe Mr. Meza-Rodriguez’s Second Amendment rights.95  
 
2.  Judge Flaum’s Concurring Opinion  
 
Judge Flaum’s concurrence did not reach the Second Amendment 
conclusion.
96
 Instead, he found § 922(g)(5) passes intermediate 
scrutiny,
97
 He would have followed the Tenth Circuit’s98 “prudential 
approach” of reserving resolution of whether the Second Amendment 
grants undocumented immigrants the right to bear arms to another case 
“that compels addressing it.”99 While noting that the Second 
Amendment might extend to undocumented immigrants under 
Verdugo-Urquidez, Judge Flaum also expressed doubt as to whether 
the Second Amendment extends past citizens based on language in 
Heller referring to “members of the national community” and “law 
abiding, responsible citizens.”100 
 
3.  Post-Decision Procedure  
 
Because the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Meza-Rodriguez created 
a circuit split, all active Seventh Circuit judges received the opinion. 
However, no judge voted to hear the case en banc. On November 16, 
2015, Mr. Meza-Rodriguez filed a petition for a writ of certiorari 
which remains pending as of the publication of this article.
101
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
95
 Id. 
96
 Id. at 674 (Flaum, J., concurring). 
97
 Id. 
98
 United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. 2010). 
99
 Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 674 (Flaum, J., concurring). 
100
 Id. 
101
 Id., petition for cert. filed (Nov. 16, 2015) (No. 15-7017). 
13
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THE CIRCUIT SPLIT  
 
A.  United States v. Portillo-Munoz
102
 
 
Almost four years before the Seventh Circuit decided Meza-
Rodriguez, the Fifth Circuit became the first circuit to examine 
whether the Second Amendment right to bear arms extends to 
unlawful aliens.
103
 In United States v. Portillo-Munoz, a Mexican 
national residing in Texas was arrested for unlawfully carrying a 
weapon and possession of a controlled substance.
104
 The defendant 
had been in the United States for eighteen months and worked as a 
ranch hand.
105
 He also financially supported his girlfriend and her 
daughter
106
 and paid rent.
107
 Upon arrest, the defendant claimed that he 
possessed the gun to protect the ranch’s chickens from coyotes.108 The 
district court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, and he pled 
guilty to being an alien unlawfully in the United States under 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(5).
109
 The defendant filed a timely notice of 
appeal.
110
  
The Fifth Circuit started its “categorical approach,”111 in the sense 
that it precludes all undocumented immigrants from constituting part 
of “the people” to whom the Second Amendment confers a right to 
bear arms, by establishing that language in Heller “provides some 
guidance” as to whether unlawful aliens are within the scope of “the 
people” protected by the Second Amendment.112 The Fifth Circuit 
                                                 
102
 643 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2011). 
103
 See generally id. 
104
 Id. at 438–39. 
105
 Id. at 439. 
106
 Id. at 437.  
107
 Id. at 443. 
108
 Id. at 438. 
109
 Id. at 439. 
110
 Id.  
111
 Id.  
112
 Id. at 440.  
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borrowed language from Heller, which Chief Judge Wood determined 
in Meza-Rodriguez was not conclusive,
113
 to presume that not only are 
unlawful immigrants not “law-abiding, responsible citizens” or 
“members of the political community,” unlawful immigrants are “not 
Americans as that word is commonly understood.”114   
The Fifth Circuit also declined to apply the sufficient connections 
test from Verdugo-Urquidez.
115
 That court reasoned that the Supreme 
Court never actually held that Fourth Amendment protections extend 
to “a native and citizen of another nation who entered and remained in 
the United States illegally.”116 
The court then addressed Verdugo-Urquidez.
117
 Unlike the 
Seventh Circuit in Meza-Rodriguez, the Fifth Circuit found that the 
Second and Fourth Amendments should be read differently.
118
 First, 
the Fifth Circuit highlighted the idea that the Verdugo-Urquidez Court 
did not expressly hold that the Fourth Amendment extends to natives 
and citizens of other nations who are in the United States illegally.
119
 
The Fifth Circuit went on to say that even if undocumented 
immigrants hold Fourth Amendment protections that does not mean 
that Second Amendment protections attach as well.
120
 The court 
focused on the different purposes of the two amendments; the Second 
Amendment confers an “affirmative right” whereas the Fourth 
Amendment confers a “protective right.”121 The Fifth Circuit reasoned 
that since affirmative rights do not extend so far as protective rights, 
the Second Amendment protects more limited groups than does the 
Fourth Amendment, and thus an extension of Verdugo-Urquidez to the 
                                                 
113
 United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir. 2015).  
114
 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440. 
115
 Id. 
116
 Id. 
117
 Id.  
118
 Id.  
119
 Id. at 441. 
120
 Id. 
121
 Id. at 440–41. 
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Second Amendment realm was misguided.
122
 After distinguishing 
Verdugo-Rodriguez, the court highlighted the deference given to 
Congress in immigration matters, specifically highlighting the idea 
that undocumented immigrants could turn into political assassins if the 
prohibition on their gun rights did not exist.
123
 
 
1.  Judge Dennis’ Dissent 
 
Judge Dennis penned a dissent that reads very closely to Chief 
Judge Wood’s Seventh Circuit opinion in Meza-Rodriguez.124 Judge 
Dennis found that the Verdugo-Urquidez sufficient connections test 
applied because Heller established that “the people” protected by the 
Second Amendment are the same as those also protected by the First 
and Fourth Amendments.
125
 Applying the test, he found that the 
defendant “plainly satisfie[d] both criteria” because he was voluntarily 
present in the United States for eighteen months, paid rent, and 
financially supported his girlfriend and daughter.
126
 
He also cautioned against the majority’s reading of “the people,” 
highlighting the “far-reaching consequences” of its reading.127 
According to Judge Dennis, a reading that excluded undocumented 
immigrants from the protections of the Second Amendment could also 
exclude those immigrants, containing potentially millions of people, 
from First and Fourth Amendment protections.
128
 Finally, Judge 
Dennis also found the majority’s distinction between an affirmative 
right and a protective right “unpersuasive” since Heller described the 
Second Amendment right as a codification of a pre-existing right.
129
 
 
                                                 
122
 Id. 
123
 Id. 
124
 See id. at 442 (Dennis, J., dissenting). 
125
 Id.  
126
 Id. at 447.  
127
 Id. at 443.  
128
 Id. at 444.   
129
 Id.  
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B.  United States v. Flores
130
 
 
Like Portillo-Munoz, where the district court adopted the 
recommendation of a magistrate judge, the District of Minnesota 
adopted the recommendations of a magistrate judge, and concluded 
that unlawful aliens do not possess a Second Amendment right in 
United States v. Flores.
131
 The Eighth Circuit’s per curiam opinion 
affirmed the district court without elaboration, agreeing with the Fifth 
Circuit’s categorical approach in Portillo-Munoz.132 
In Flores, Magistrate Judge Janie S. Mayeron issued a report and 
recommendation on a 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) case where an 
undocumented immigrant was charged after being found in possession 
of a handgun.
133
 Magistrate Judge Mayeron recommended the denial 
of the defendant’s motion to dismiss his indictment.134 
Judge Mayeron relied on Heller in making this determination.
135
 
She first found that undocumented immigrants are not part of the 
“national community” or “political community,” and undocumented 
immigrants are “inherently not ‘law-abiding’” because their 
“unsanctioned entry in the United States” is a crime.136 She then cited 
to several United States district court cases from 2008 to 2010 that 
found that the Second Amendment did not extend to undocumented 
immigrants.
137
 She then distinguished INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, which 
stated that undocumented immigrants held Fourth Amendment 
protections, by focusing on the idea that the United States did not 
                                                 
130
 663 F.3d 1022 (8th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
131
 Id. at 1023. 
132
 Id.  
133
 United States v. Flores, No. 10-178 (JNE/JSM), 2010 WL 4721069, at *1 
(D. Minn. Sept. 17, 2010). 
134
 Id. at *4. 
135
 Id. at *2. 
136
 Id. 
137
 Id. at *3. 
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make a finding as to whether undocumented immigrants were afforded 
Fourth Amendment protections in this case.
138
   
She also distinguished Verdugo-Urquidez.
139
 First, Magistrate 
Judge Mayeron acknowledged that in Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court 
noted that it had yet to determine whether undocumented immigrants 
retained Fourth Amendment protections.
140
 However, she did 
acknowledge that the Verdugo-Urquidez Court insisted that Fourth 
Amendment protection would depend on whether the undocumented 
immigrant had accepted societal obligations.
141
 Accordingly, 
Magistrate Judge Mayeron could “envision” an undocumented 
immigrant who is involved in the community and law-abiding.
142
 
However, the facts of Flores did not present that opportunity.
143
 The 
District Court of Minnesota accepted Magistrate Judge Mayeron’s 
report and recommendation and denied the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss.
144
 The Eighth Circuit emphatically affirmed in a per curiam 
decision.
145
 The Supreme Court denied certiorari.
146
 
 
C.  United States v. Carpio-Leon
147
 
 
The Fourth Circuit also considered this issue in United States v. 
Carpio-Leon.
148
 In Carpio-Leon, a Mexican national was arrested for 
violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) after a consensual search of his home 
                                                 
138
 Id. at *4.  
139
 Id.  
140
 Id.  
141
 Id.  
142
 Id.  
143
 Id. at *4. 
144
  United States v. Flores, No. 10-178 (JNE/JSM), 2010 WL 4720223, *2 (D. 
Minn. Nov. 15, 2010). 
145
  United States v. Flores, 663 F.3d 1022, 1023 (8th Cir. 2011). 
146
  Flores v. United States, 133. S. Ct. 28 (2012). 
147
 701 F.3d 974 (4th Cir. 2012). 
148
 Id. 
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in the United States uncovered weapons.
149
 The defendant had been in 
the United States for thirteen years, fathered three United States citizen 
children with his wife, had no criminal record, and filed tax returns.
150
 
However, he did use false social security documents to obtain a 
driver’s license.151 
The Fourth Circuit first examined whether the scope of the 
Second Amendment right to bear arms extends to undocumented 
immigrants.
152
 The court mentioned the Verdugo-Urquidez sufficient 
connections test, but also acknowledged that undocumented 
immigrants may never be part of the political community and, thus, 
not part of “the people” to whom the Second Amendment confers a 
right.
153
 Ambiguously, the court left open the possibility that 
undocumented immigrants may be included in “the people” of the 
Second Amendment.
154
 
The court focused almost exclusively on the language from Heller 
that the courts in Portillo-Munoz and Flores relied on: ‘“law-abiding, 
responsible citizens.”’155 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that 
undocumented immigrants “do not belong” in a “class of law-abiding 
members of the political community” to whom the Second 
Amendment gives protection.”156 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the 
“crime of illegal entry inherently” excludes undocumented immigrants 
from “the people.”157 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss his indictment,158 and the 
Supreme Court denied certiorari.
159
 
                                                 
149
 Id. at 975. 
150
 Id. 
151
 Id. 
152
 Id. at 978. 
153
 Id. 
154
 Id. 
155
 Id. at 979 (quoting Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008)). 
156
 Id. 
157
 Id. at 981. 
158
 Id. at 983. 
159
 Carpio-Leon v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 58 (2013). 
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D.  United States v. Huitron-Guizar
160
 
 
The Tenth Circuit decided United States v. Huitron-Guizar in 
2012, after Portillo-Munoz and Flores but before Carpio-Leon and 
Meza-Rodriguez. Instead of employing a categorical approach like the 
Fifth, Eighth, and Fourth circuits to hold that undocumented 
immigrants are not part of “the people” to whom the Second 
Amendment confers a right to bear arms, the Tenth Circuit employed a 
prudential approach
161
 similar to Judge Flaum’s concurrence in Meza-
Rodriguez. The Tenth Circuit did not attempt to define “the people” or 
consider whether undocumented immigrants are part of that group. It 
found those questions “large and complicated.”162 Instead, the Tenth 
Circuit preferred to “avoid the constitutional question by assuming, for 
purposes of this case, that the Second Amendment, as a ‘right of the 
people,’ could very well include, in the absence of a statute restricting 
such a right, at least some unlawfully here.”163 The Tenth Circuit held 
that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) passed intermediate scrutiny.
164
 The 
Supreme Court denied certiorari.
165
 
 
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT READING OF “THE PEOPLE” COMPORTS WITH 
PRECEDENT AND CONSISTENCY 
 
Since 2011, four federal circuit courts have addressed whether the 
Second Amendment confers a right to bear arms to undocumented 
immigrants.
166
 While the Supreme Court has left the issue open by 
                                                 
160
 678 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. 2012). 
161
 Id. at 1169. 
162
 Id. 
163
 Id. 
164
 Id. at 1170. 
165
 Huitron-Guizar v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 289 (2012). 
166
 See United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2011); United 
States v. Flores, 663 F.3d 1022 (8th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); United States v. Carpio-
Leon, 701 F.3d 974 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664 
(7th Cir. 2015).  
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denying certiorari to the previous three decisions, the approach 
adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Meza-Rodriguez is superior because 
it aligns with precedent and provides a consistent reading of the 
constitutional amendments that mention “the people.” 
First, the reading of the Second Amendment adopted by the Fifth, 
Eighth, and Fourth Circuits undervalues the emphasis the Supreme 
Court placed on the Verdugo-Urquidez sufficient connections test in 
Heller. The Heller Court did not attempt to outline an exhaustive list 
of who constitutes “the people” as defined by the Second 
Amendment.
167
 Instead, the Heller Court looked to Verdugo-Urquidez 
to find that “the people” encompasses “all members of the political 
community, not an unspecified subset.”168 Therefore, in Heller, a 
Second Amendment case, the Court invoked the definition of “the 
people” put forth in Verdugo-Urquidez, a Fourth Amendment case.169 
This suggests that the Supreme Court reads “the people” consistently 
“in all six other provisions of the Constitution that mention ‘the 
people.’”170 By not employing the Verdugo-Urquidez sufficient 
connections test in the Second Amendment context, the Fifth, Eighth, 
and Fourth Circuits complicated an already vague and amorphous 
phrase. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit’s application of the sufficient 
connections test reflects a consistent reading of the Supreme Court’s 
cases that discuss who constitute “the people.”171 Indeed, the Seventh 
Circuit’s interpretation of the language of the Second Amendment 
“treat[s] identical phrasing the same way” and respects that the “first 
ten amendments were adopted as a package.”172 
The Fourth, Eighth, and Fifth circuits relied on other language in 
Heller that might suggest that Heller stood for the proposition that the 
Second Amendment right to bear arms is limited to “all Americans”173 
                                                 
167
 Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 (2008). 
168
 Id.  
169
 Id. 
170
 Id. 
171
 Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664.  
172
 Id. at 670. 
173
 Heller, 554 U.S. at 581. 
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or to “law-abiding, responsible citizens.”174 “All Americans”175 is a 
vague term. People in the United States can surely be considered 
Americans; the United States is located in North America. However, 
Americans may also refer to human beings in Central America or 
South America. To take proprietary ownership of the term 
“Americans” ignores the fact that the United States is just one country 
out of many, including those located in Central and South America, 
that may refer to its people as “Americans.”   
In addition, “law-abiding, responsible citizens”176 is another 
phrase that promotes ambiguity. While it may seem easy enough to 
determine who is law-abiding and who is not, this is less clear in the 
immigration context. As the Seventh Circuit noted, many 
undocumented immigrants in the United States arrived in this country 
as young children and “were too young to form the requisite intent” to 
contravene the immigration laws of the United States.
177
 While a 
person may become aware of her undocumented status as she grows 
older, new programs such as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
provides avenues to protect those persons from removal 
proceedings.
178
 The Fifth Circuit in Portillo-Munoz did not take that 
idea into account; it stated plainly that “aliens who enter or remain in 
this country illegally are not Americans.”179 Similarly, the Fourth 
Circuit in Carpio-Leon concluded, without elaborating, that “illegal 
aliens are not law-abiding members of the political community.”180 In 
her report and recommendation to the United States District Court for 
the District of Minnesota, Magistrate Judge Mayeron stated that any 
person who enters the United States unlawfully is “inherently not 
                                                 
174
 Id. at 635. 
175
 Id. at 581. 
176
 Id. at 635. 
177
 United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664, 673 (7th Cir. 2015).  
178
 Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, U.S. CITIZENSHIP 
AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-
deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca (last updated Aug. 3, 2015). 
179
 United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 440 (5th Cir. 2011). 
180
 United States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F.3d 974, 979 (4th Cir. 2012). 
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‘law-abiding’”181 and does not retain a Second Amendment right to 
bear arms.
182
 While those courts stress the “law-abiding, responsible 
citizens” language in Heller, that language was not controlling as to 
whether Second Amendment rights extend to undocumented 
immigrants. That type of analysis misses a crucial point in Heller: to 
determine who constitutes “the people” to whom the Second 
Amendment confers a right to bear arms, the Heller Court emphasized 
its sufficient connections test as laid out in Verdugo-Urquidez.
183
 
Instead of precluding undocumented immigrants from a Second 
Amendment rights by highlighting the vague language in Heller and 
ignoring the Heller Court’s emphasis on the Verdugo-Urquidez 
sufficient connections test, the Seventh Circuit correctly applied the 
test consistently. 
Moreover, the Fifth Circuit’s attempt to disregard Verdugo-
Urquidez through an attenuated distinction between the Fourth and 
Second Amendments presents a distinction without a difference. The 
Fifth Circuit in Portillo-Munoz stated that the two amendments carried 
different purposes: the Second Amendment confers an affirmative 
right, whereas the Fourth Amendment is protective.
184
 This distinction 
is problematic in light of Heller. The Heller Court noted that the 
“Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendment, codified a 
pre-existing right.”185 Heller never refers to any “affirmative right” 
when discussing the Second Amendment or “protective right” when 
discussing the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit’s 
distinction between the Second and Fourth Amendments ignores the 
Heller Court’s insistence on consistency when interpreting identical 
language.
186
 The Heller Court clarified that a reading of the Second 
Amendment that limited “the people” would not level with the other 
                                                 
181
 United States v. Flores, No. 10-178 (JNE/JSM) 2010 WL 4721069, at*2 (D. 
Minn. Sept. 17, 2010). 
182
 Id. 
183
 Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 (2008). 
184
 Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440–41. 
185
 Heller, 554 U.S. at 593 (emphasis in original). 
186
 See id. at 580. 
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six constitutional provisions that contain “the people.”187 It then 
immediately invoked Verdugo-Urquidez’s sufficient connections test to 
clarify the meaning of “the people.”188 Instead of analyzing the issue 
consistently with Heller and Verdugo-Urquidez, the Fifth Circuit 
forged a new, meaningless path based on perceived amendment 
purposes, without further elaboration. It should also be noted that 
neither the Fourth nor the Eighth circuits, the only other appeals courts 
to hold similarly to Portillo-Munoz, have adopted a similar line of 
reasoning based on an amendment’s purpose. Conversely, the Seventh 
Circuit in Meza-Rodriguez appropriately followed Heller and Verdugo-
Urquidez.
189
 In so doing, the Seventh Circuit presented a line of 
reasoning that is consistent with Supreme Court cases, and that can 
serve as a superior model for other circuits. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
While the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, three 
federal circuit courts of appeals have held that undocumented 
immigrants fall outside “the people” to whom the Second Amendment 
confers a right to bear arms. In so doing, those circuits have 
undervalued, and even ignored, language in previous Supreme Court 
cases. The Seventh Circuit’s recent opinion in United States v. Meza-
Rodriguez addressed the issue in a manner superior to the Fifth, 
Eighth, and Fourth Circuits. The Seventh Circuit followed Supreme 
Court reasoning on the Fourth Amendment to read identical language 
consistently and made a logical extension of the meaning of “the 
people” to Meza-Rodriguez. In so doing, the Seventh Circuit correctly 
determined that undocumented immigrants in the United States make 
up part of “the people” to whom the Second Amendment confers a 
right to bear arms. 
                                                 
187
 Id. 
188
 Id. 
189
 See United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664, 669–70 (7th Cir. 
2015).  
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